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Institutionalising Cosmopolitan Responsibilities to the Global Poor: 
Institutional Cosmopolitanism, Human Rights and the State  
 
 
Within the field of International Political Theory (IPT) there has been a growing concern for the 
forms of political representation and governance necessary to achieve global justice. While the 
field of IPT considers the nature and defensibility of ethical principles regarding issues such as 
just war theory, human rights and distributive justice, the field now overtly considers the forms 
of appropriate global governance in the process of addressing specific international ethical issues. 
The literature addressing the issue of global poverty has typified this renewed focus on governing 
structures and policies. In particular, cosmopolitan scholarship has been at the forefront of 
efforts to consider political structures capable of realising justice in a more robust manner than 
prevailing global governance arrangements. In particular, the arguments of Thomas Pogge have 
contributed significantly to scholarly thinking about global poverty. A central foundation of 
cosmopolitan contributions has been the argument that addressing extreme poverty is not 
charity or beneficence on the part of wealthy societies and individuals, but a moral obligation of 
the wealthy which stems from the human rights of the global poor. This obligation is not being 
met given the prevailing severity of extreme global poverty. Cosmopolitans contend that global 
arrangements ought to promote a standard of universal justice which provides the fundamental 
human rights of all people wherever they reside in the world. This necessitates rearranging the 
structures and policies of global governance. Specifically, Pogge’s scheme of “institutional 
cosmopolitanism” aspires to fulfil this obligation by institutionalising human rights in the 
international and transnational structures of global governance1.  
 
This essay critically engages with cosmopolitan arguments by questioning whether the global 
institutions generated by human rights are sufficient to productively guide political action in 
theory and practice in relation to global poverty. While reforming global institutions with a 
thorough commitment to human rights and identifying global moral responsibilities is necessary 
to a proposed global order that avoids the global deprivations currently being visited upon the 
world’s most vulnerable people, the question is whether global institutions and moral 
responsibilities alone are sufficient. The argument in this essay is that a viable guide to political 
action which alleviates global poverty must also take account of the potential utility of local 
institutions such as the state and advance proposals which allow less developed states to have 
capacity for local action to address poverty. Consequently, scholarly attention within IPT should 
also encompass feasible local institutional designs which can support efforts to promote poverty 
alleviation – not just on global institutional forms which relate to global moral responsibilities 
which address extreme poverty.  
 
The argument that cosmopolitan proposals need a stronger account of local institutions to 
address extreme global poverty proceeds in three steps. First, the paper considers the foremost 
cosmopolitan argument in respect to global poverty in the form of Thomas Pogge’s analysis of 
the moral responsibilities which result from existing patterns of global poverty and the 
cosmopolitan institutions which could ameliorate this circumstance. Second, the paper identifies 
some problematic aspects of IC. Specifically, that cosmopolitanism struggles to grapple with the 
significance of local political dynamics and the prospect that the appeal to human rights is not 
politically compelling enough to create strong global moral responsibilities and institutions. The 
last section considers the some of the ethical and political implications of focusing upon local 
political agency and the promotion of robust state institutions. The claim is made that IPT 
examinations of prospective forms of global governance need to more fully consider the 
                                                 
1 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), p. 169. 
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productive role of the state, especially when it comes to formulating a political program which 
moves towards alleviating global poverty. 
 
Thomas Pogge, Human Rights and Global Poverty 
 
Cosmopolitanism has become a prominent line of reasoning within IPT. Obviously, 
cosmopolitanism has a long history with Diogenes expressing the idea that individuals are 
citizens of world.2 The cosmopolitan ethical impulse is a resolute commitment to the universal 
community of humanity and a sense of detachment from solely local or national affiliations. 
However, contemporary cosmopolitan arguments are diverse with a range of motivations 
underpinning the notion of a universal community of humanity.3 Furthermore, there are a range 
of differing articulations of the political and institutional forms which are required to support a 
universal concern for humanity. The most modest form of cosmopolitanism is “moral 
cosmopolitanism” which advances universal principles of human concern which act as standards 
by which existing political arrangements and institutions should be justified and criticised.4 An 
example of this form of cosmopolitanism is evident in robust articulations of human rights. The 
most elaborate articulation of cosmopolitanism is referred to as “political cosmopolitanism” 
which advocates the creation of universal political institutions at a global level which include all 
people of the world in the articulation of democratic global institutions. While there are many 
examples of contemporary political cosmopolitan thought, the strongest accounts of political 
cosmopolitanism are those of Daniele Archibugi, Richard Falk, Anthony McGrew, and 
especially, David Held’s articulation of cosmopolitan democracy. 
 
In between these articulations of cosmopolitanism, is a position usefully termed “institutional 
cosmopolitanism” by Thomas Pogge. This position aspires to realise human rights through the 
restructuring of existing international arrangements and the development of new institutions 
which formally recognise human rights as having fundamental priority over other social and 
economic objectives, as well as possessing the capacity to distribute resources to fulfil the 
fundamental human rights of individuals around the world. Rather than being a mere standard to 
gauge the affairs and practices of nation-states, institutional cosmopolitanism entails the 
development of a range of practical institutions which transcend nation-states in order to arrange 
an institutional context which fulfils the indispensable needs of all human beings. In order to 
appreciate the position of institutional cosmopolitanism (IC) it is necessary to detail Pogge’s 
understanding of the political structures which permit the existing patterns of global poverty and 
the form of moral responsibilities which stem from the continuing preservation of these unjust 
institutional arrangements. 
 
Pogge and cosmopolitans call attention to the massive suffering stemming from global poverty. 
While there have been some important improvements in the aggregate condition of the world’s 
poor, “One in five people in the world—more than 1 billion people—still survive on less than $1 
a day” and another “1.5 billion people live on $1–$2 a day”5. It is hard to overstate the horror of 
contemporary global poverty given that these income levels produce numerous poverty related 
deaths around the developing world. Pogge indicates that poverty related disasters are not 
                                                 
2 Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” in Martha Nussbaum (ed.), For Love of Country (Boston, 
Beacon Press, 1996), p. 7.  
3 Nicholas Rengger, “Political Theory and International Relations: Promised Land or Exit From Eden” International 
Affairs Vol. 76 Number 4, October 2000, p. 763.   
4 Charles Beitz, “International Liberalism and Distributive Justice” World Politics, 51 (January 1999), p. 287. For a 
similar conception see Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism”, pp. 7-8. 
5 United Nations Development Program, 2005 Human Development Report (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2005), p 24. 
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unprecedented; there were 30 million poverty related deaths resulting from the ‘Great Leap 
Forward’ in China from 1959–62, as well as other famines.6 However, 
 
In just 16 years since the end of the Cold War, some 300 million human beings have died 
prematurely from poverty-related causes, with some 18 million more added each year. Much larger 
numbers of human beings must live in conditions of life-threatening poverty that make it very 
difficult for them to articulate their interests and effectively to fend for themselves and their 
families7. 
 
The disquieting fact is that this extraordinary level of avoidable deprivation prevails in the midst 
of a world that is increasingly prosperous. Furthermore, various international human rights 
agreements have repeatedly stated that severe economic deprivation is morally unacceptable. 
International efforts to highlight and address the issue of extreme poverty are evident in the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Socio-economic human rights were 
articulated and fully developed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
The Declaration on the Right to Development and The Convention of the Rights of the Child. These 
principles are regarded as being an indivisible part of the broader human rights agenda, as well as 
part of the UN’s agenda of promoting human rights to entrench international peace and security. 
Articulations of socio-economic human rights can be seen as indications of an international 
normative consensus which sees human dignity as being incompatible with starvation and 
deprivation. The essential point about this international consensus against extreme poverty and 
the right to subsist is that while “the right itself has obtained a broad based cross-cultural 
consensus across the society of states…controversy remains around the different economic, 
social and political questions involved in its implementation, but the right itself is not 
contested”8. This international concern coalesced into the signing of the United Nations Millennium 
Declaration in 2000 and the resulting eight Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which 
articulated a multifaceted response to extreme global poverty. 
 
Pogge is quick to indicate that “socioeconomic human rights, such as that ‘to a standard of living 
adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including food, clothing, 
housing, and medical care’ (UDHR, Art. 25) are currently, and by far, the most frequently 
violated human rights”9. The reasons for this are varied. While the practice of socio-economic 
human rights was frustrated by a lack of support by Western states during the Cold War, the 
development of socio-economic human rights international law during and after the Cold War 
indicates that many governments in the developing world valued and supported UN efforts to 
address extreme poverty. Furthermore, the implementation of socio-economic human rights 
clashes with other components of global governance and other ideological forces in world 
politics. The impact of the legal and policy elements associated with global capitalism are 
asserted as one of the key frustrations of subsistence human rights because socio-economic 
human rights agreements are largely soft-law rhetorical agreements and declarations whereas 
global capitalism is “embodied in much harder legal and organizational forms”10. As Pogge 
asserts the human rights of the world’s poor are “recognized and violated by international law”11.  
 
                                                 
6 Thomas Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor," Leiden 
Journal of International Law 18, no. 4 (2005), p. 741. 
7 Ibid.: , p. 740. 
8 Ana Gonzalez-Pelaez and Barry    Buzan, "A Viable Project of Solidarism? The Neglected Contributions of John 
Vincent's Basic Rights Initiative," International Relations 17 (2003), p. 328. 
9 Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law: The Human Rights of the Global Poor.", p. 718. 
10 Gonzalez-Pelaez and Buzan, "A Viable Project of Solidarism?", p. 332. 
11 Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law" 
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While the development of the MDGs may or may not be an important step forward in efforts to 
effectively address global poverty, Cosmopolitan scholars such as Pogge have clearly articulated 
that existing measures aimed at addressing poverty have failed to uphold basic human rights 
relating to subsistence. More pointedly, Pogge suggests that the prevailing institutional order has 
permitted gross abuses of human rights: “affluent countries, partly through the global 
institutional order they impose, bear a great causal and moral responsibility for the massive 
global persistence of severe poverty”12. Cosmopolitans contend that human rights require 
maximal efforts to protect individuals from the consequences of extreme deprivation wherever 
they live. That is, universal human rights entail the promotion of moral responsibilities which 
extend beyond any one national political community and the formulation of global institutions 
which give effect to these rights. The goal of these thinkers is to get human rights to challenge 
rather than parallel the existence of extreme global poverty. This entails the development of a 
global institutional context where extreme poverty is addressed by cosmopolitan ideas and 
institutions which entrench individual human rights in a more substantial way. 
 
Pogge’s argument focuses on the role that the prevailing institutional order plays in creating and 
sustaining global poverty, and consequently the responsibility that Western governments and 
societies bear in not promoting an institutional order which adequately fulfils subsistence human 
rights. As Pogge forcefully asserts, 
We are familiar, through charity appeals, with the assertion that it lies in our hands to save the lives of 
many or, by doing nothing, to let these people die. We are less familiar with the assertion examined here 
of a weightier responsibility: that most of us do not merely let people starve but also participate in 
starving them13. 
Pogge claims “we are harming the global poor if and insofar as we collaborate in imposing an 
unjust global institutional order upon them” which “foreseeably perpetuates large-scale human 
rights deficits that would be reasonably avoidable through feasible institutional modifications”14. 
His use of the term ‘we’ refers to those who benefit from the prevailing institutional order – 
principally those in Western states. His focus on the moral responsibility of people in Western 
states is borne out of duties stemming from human rights, specifically that there is not 
necessarily a positive responsibility to help those in need but there is definitely a negative 
responsibility derived from human rights not to benefit from or participate in harming the global 
poor. For Pogge negative duties stem from the moral need to ensure “that others are not unduly 
harmed (or wronged) through one’s conduct”, while positive duties are where we have “a duty to 
benefit persons or to shield them from other harms”15. While scholars like Peter Singer have 
argued that addressing global poverty is a positive duty of the wealthy to the global poor, 16 for 
Pogge the responsibly of the wealthy to assist the global poor stems from the duty not to 
participate in a global order which is harming them. 
 
Pogge’s focus on the negative duty to not contribute to harming the global poor leads to a clear 
directive: because the prevailing global institutional order does not adequately fulfil fundamental 
socio-economic human rights, this institutional order must be urgently transformed. Moral 
responsibility stems from the duties of human right claims, specifically to avoid harming other 
human beings. Consequently, responsibility to change this institutional scheme rests with those 
not upholding this fundamental duty – the same individuals and governments currently 
                                                 
12 Thomas Pogge, "The First UN Millennium Development Goal: a Cause for Celebration?," Journal of Human 
Development 5, no. 3 (2004), p. 392. 
13 Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 214. 
14 Thomas Pogge, "World Poverty and Human Rights," Ethics and International Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005), p. 5. 
15 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 130. 
16 Peter Singer, "The Singer Solution to World Poverty," New York Times 5 September 1999. 
 5
benefiting from the institutional order which produces and reproduces patterns of extreme 
poverty. Socio-economic human rights are central to productively transforming prevailing 
international law and international organizations, as well as being the motivation for new 
institutional forms which actively promote the individual rights of the global poor. This directive 
is vulnerable to the charge that the prevailing global order does not unequivocally perpetuate 
extreme poverty. This will be examined further in the next section. However, Pogge’s argument 
is also dependent on the prospect of an alternative global institutional order which diminishes 
the harm to the global poor. The feasibility of Pogge’s proposals to address global poverty is 
crucial to the claim that the current system is indefensible.  
 
Pogge’s alternative global order of “institutional cosmopolitanism” involves a restructuring of 
existing international structures and the development of some new international and 
transnational frameworks which promote the interests of the global poor in a significant and 
sustained manner. In terms of reforming existing international institutions, Pogge argues that to 
achieve a “global order less burdensome on the global poor” it is necessary that affluent 
countries move beyond prevailing conceptions of development and make  
 
the international trade, lending, investment, and intellectual-property regimes fairer to the global poor as 
well as some costs of compensating for harms done – for example by helping to fund basic health 
facilities, vaccination programmes, basic schooling, school lunches, safe water and sewage systems, basic 
housing, power plants and networks, banks and microlending, and road, rail, and communication links 
where these do not yet exist17. 
 
Specifically Pogge proposes that the World Trade Organization (WTO) should cease permitting 
Western protectionism that disadvantages the developing world. Obviously Pogge is not alone in 
this claim. A 2002 Oxfam report claims that if developing countries were able to increase their 
market share of world trade by one percent that it would lift 128 million of the world’s poorest 
people out of poverty18. Furthermore, Pogge also criticizes the way Trade Related Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) in the WTO which relate to pharmaceutical patents, neglect the 
interests of the unwell in the developing world. He suggests redesigning these institutional 
arrangements so that pharmaceutical patents are rewarded to the extent they alleviate the 
burdens of disease and illness around the world19.  
 
Pogge claims that the ways the global order bestows important rights upon the rulers of states is 
important to the development of dysfunctional states which plays a key role in constituting 
global patterns of poverty. Pogge points out that while membership of international 
organizations (such as the WTO) is formally voluntary, it is only the rulers who have an active 
choice in the matter, not the public of many states20. The global order privileges the leaders of 
states, and the population is bound by international agreements, regardless of the level of public 
engagement. He also claims that “international resource, borrowing, treaty, and arms privileges 
we extend to such rulers are quite advantageous to them, providing them with the money and 
arms they need to stay in power”21. This is especially the case with the way these privileges allow 
governments “to dispose of the country’s natural resources (international resource privilege) and 
freely to borrow in the country’s name (international borrowing privilege)”22. These privileges 
often do not lead to tangible benefits to the poor within these societies. This observation 
                                                 
17 Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law", p. 744. 
18 Oxfam, Rigged rules and double standards: trade, globalisation and the fight against poverty (Oxfam International, 2002) 
available from http://www.maketradefair.com/assets/english/report_english.pdf, p. 5. (accessed 2/1/2006) 
19 Thomas Pogge, “Human Rights and Global Health: A Research Program” Metaphilosophy 36,1-2, 2005, 182–209. 
20 Pogge, "The First UN Millennium Development Goal", p. 392. 
21 Pogge, "World Poverty and Human Rights", p. 7. 
22 Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law", p. 737. 
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highlights a point that Pogge sees local institutions as very much being constructed by a global 
institutional order created and sustained by the affluent countries operating in conjunction with 
local elites.  
 
Pogge’s response to the ways these privileges in the global order systematically disadvantage and 
entrench the global poor is to develop a international institutional context which sharply restricts 
these privileges. Specifically, IC would entail a “global resource dividend” in which a proportion 
of all traded natural resources would be directed at ensuring that the global poor would be able 
to fulfil their basic needs, wherever they may reside23. Pogge also proposes, in relation to the 
problems of autocratic regimes abusing their international borrowing privileges, that there should 
be a constitutional amendment in all states that loans borrowed by authoritarian rulers are not 
binding for consequently constitutional democratic regimes. Such a proposal would deter banks 
from lending to authoritarian states. Pogge claims this would deter coup d’états and prevent 
autocratic regimes derailing development trajectories by imposing large debt burdens on 
subsequent legitimate governments24.  The important consequence of Pogge’s proposal of IC is 
that programs such as the global resource dividend and restrictions on international borrowing 
privileges would condition the ways state sovereignty would be exercised and create institutions 
that would cut across state boundaries. Yet importantly, these institutions would not seek to 
create - or necessitate - a world government or global democracy as articulated by other 
cosmopolitans. 
 
Critiquing Institutional Cosmopolitanism  
 
Pogge has highlighted the graphic scale of contemporary global poverty, critically scrutinized 
attitudes and interests which permit global poverty to persist, and most importantly, proposed a 
range of alternative political structures which address the basic economic needs of those 
currently neglected. The proposal of IC rests in between the moral and political conceptions of 
cosmopolitanism. Nonetheless, IC is a dramatic reworking of the prevailing structures of global 
governance. The new institutions proposed by Pogge and the reforming existing international 
institutions to ensure that the needs of poor individuals around the world would be prioritised by 
international institutions would be a substantial shift away from the prevailing approaches to 
combating global poverty. The arrangement of IC would be animated by a direct line of moral 
responsibility from the wealthy – largely Western societies to the global poor.  
 
However, while these proposals would work within the prevailing system of states, questions 
certainly remain whether this approach is feasible and realistic in political terms. It certainly 
appears, given the power of Western states, the hegemonic position of neo-liberal capitalism in 
policy-making circles and the narrow domestic concerns of many Western governments, that 
Pogge’s proposals appear politically un-realistic. However, the viability of cosmopolitan 
proposals, and the viability of realising global justice in general, is not determined only by the 
likelihood of realizing these proposals but rather whether these proposals act as a defensible 
ethical guide to political action. Viability rests both on questions of political feasibility and ethical 
defensibility in theory and practice. Given the specific moral responsibilities identified by Pogge 
and the detailed nature of the institutional reforms, IC is significantly more compelling program 
of action than other accounts which do not offer the same level of detail and specificity. 
Nevertheless, there are two important issues surrounding the proposal of IC which condition its 
utility as a guide to action in theory and practice.  
 
                                                 
23 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 196-7. 
24 Ibid, p. 153-5. 
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The first issue to consider is whether Pogge’s emphasis on the influence of global factors and 
institutions means that IC understates the importance of local factors. While Pogge claims that 
most economists use “explanatory nationalism” to overstate the significance of local forces for 
poverty25, Allan Patten suggests that Pogge has fallen into the “opposite trap” and engaged in 
“explanatory cosmopolitanism”26. However, Pogge is on strong ground when he identifies the 
ways that the global order bestows international privileges on states and in the ways by which 
transnational connections create some supposedly ‘local’ factors. For instance, while local 
corruption if often cited as a local factor which causes underdevelopment (and a reason not to 
bestow development assistance), Pogge indicates that corruption has been historically supported 
by Western transnational corporations paying the bribes (and receiving tax deductions in 
Western countries until 1999)27. While identifying the global derivation of local factors has a 
significant level of analytical purchase given the nature of contemporary globalization, local 
institutions and policies are still important to development outcomes. Furthermore, even in an 
ideal world where people are aware of their moral responsibilities and pursue them consistently, 
local practices and institutions would matter to IC given that this articulation of 
cosmopolitanism intentionally falls short of a cosmopolitan democracy or world government.  
 
While there is no doubt that accelerating globalization has conditioned the nature of local-
domestic factors, local social and political conditions affect development of particular states in 
profound ways – for good or ill28. The momentous rise of China, India and other South East 
Asian economies, and the success of some less developed states, demonstrates that sound local 
governance in the form of robust local institutions and economic policies are important to 
engage with the global economy in a productive fashion and promote socio-economic 
development29. On the other side of the balance sheet, local factors could impede the realization 
of IC even in the best of circumstances where wealthy states embrace their global moral 
responsibility to assist the global poor. In particular, there may be problematic local political 
dynamics such as despotism or severe civil conflict which impede the benefits of a cosmopolitan 
international order. In these circumstances, state institutions with robust levels of local legitimacy 
are a crucial component of a political and economic context able to alleviate poverty. 
 
The case of civil conflict needs further elaboration. Civil conflict has been a major dynamic in 
the poverty of the world’s poorest states30. Poverty and civil conflict are co-joined in a vicious 
circle. These civil conflicts result from the fact that many poor states around the world are 
colonial constructs which often have low levels of social cohesion and are wracked by ethnic 
cleavages and past civil conflicts. Essentially, many post colonial states are weak or failing states. 
These conflicts were particularly significant in the 1990s with the end of the Cold War, especially 
in Africa31. The 2005 UNDP report claims that “of the 32 countries in the low human 
development section of the HDI [Human Development Index] table, 22 have experienced 
conflict at some point since 1990 and 5 of these experienced human development reversals over 
the decade.”32 Some of the evidence is startling regarding countries recently affected or engaged 
in civil conflict:  
 
                                                 
25 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 110-2. 
26 Alan Patten, "Should We Stop Thinking About Poverty In Terms of Helping The Poor?," Ethics and International 
Affairs 19, no. 1 (2005), p. 23. 
27 Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law", p. 736. 
28 Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities of Our Time (London: Penguin, 2005), Chapter 3. 
29 United Nations Development Program, 2005 Human Development Report, p. 16. 
30 Paul Collier, et al, Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy (Washington, DC: World Bank & 
Oxford University Press, 2003), Chp 1. 
31 Ibid, p. 93. 
32 United Nations Development Program, 2005 Human Development Report, p. 154. 
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• Nine of the 10 lowest HDI countries have experienced conflict at some point since 1990. Only two of 
them were democracies. 
• Seven of the 10 countries in the bottom ranking in GDP per capita have undergone conflict in recent 
years. 
• Five of the 10 countries with the lowest life expectancy suffered conflict in the last 15 years. 
• Nine of the 10 countries with the highest infant mortality and child mortality rates have suffered conflict 
in recent years. 
• Eight of the 10 countries with the lowest primary enrolment ratio have experienced conflict at some 
point since 1990. 
• Nine of the 18 countries whose HDI declined in the 1990s experienced conflict in the same period. Per 
capita incomes and life expectancy fell in virtually all of these countries33.  
 
Furthermore, these conditions create significant refugee movements, human rights abuses and 
deaths from the actual conflicts. It is the case that these civil conflicts are fuelled by transnational 
factors such as the global arms trade (which a few wealthy states are prime beneficiaries of) and 
the international privileges that the prevailing order bestows on governments, as well as the 
poorly executed processes of decolonization. But these transnational factors do not alone cause 
local patterns of disadvantage and conflict, nor would IC totally prevent these local forms of 
conflict. Local structures and political agents play a key proximate role in specific decisions 
which lead to conflict and to subsequent patterns of insecurity and poverty34. Even though the 
proposals of IC would place restrictions on international borrowing privileges of states and 
therefore could curtail local conflict, local institutions are still a crucial component to an 
institutional order which has the potential to address extreme poverty. 
 
The outcome of these observations is to claim that local factors are important to patterns of 
extreme poverty and that stable and legitimate state institutions are important to addressing 
poverty and conflict. Therefore the point is not that IC understates local political dynamics and 
institutions, but rather the enactment of IC requires a full blooded articulation of feasible local 
institutional arrangements which connect with the overlaying institutions articulated by the IC 
program. Of course there are moral and political reasons for wealthy states to intervene and 
provide assistance to efforts to promote strong and legitimate state functions in the developing 
world, as well as hopefully, regulating the global arms trade. However, it is also important to 
relate cosmopolitanism to local institutions, especially in way which enables local states to have 
some self-directed capacity to promote development and poverty alleviation. However IC, and 
cosmopolitan thought more generally, does not engage deeply with the question of what local 
institutions and capacities are necessary for poverty alleviation. This is especially true because in 
addition to the observation that global institutions cannot readily attend or address all local 
dynamics, global institutions may also lack the capacity to deliver benefits. This is problem we 
now turn to. 
 
The second issue which conditions the approach of IC is the standing of socio-economic human 
rights. It is important to consider the political strength and appeal of human rights in non-ideal 
settings. In an ideal world, we can expect wealthy states to abide by their moral responsibilities to 
the global poor and baring problems with the global institutional order itself, or local dynamics 
as addressed previously, we can reasonably expect extreme global poverty to be ameliorated over 
time. However, in non-ideal contexts the political standing of human rights becomes crucial to 
the realization of moral responsibilities required for global justice. Despite Pogge indicating the 
importance of Article 25 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, he bases the moral 
responsibilities stemming from IC on a moral conception of human rights rather than legal 
obligations stemming from existing international human rights law. Given the dearth of 
                                                 
33 Ibid, p. 154. 
34 Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap, p. 172. 
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sustained Western government support for enforcing promulgated socio-economic rights, there 
are real questions surrounding the contemporary legal and political position of declared human 
rights35, yet alone the more profound moral conception which Pogge bases the program of IC 
upon.  
 
Clearly the “widespread recognition” of human rights has not been matched by sustained 
implementation of socio-economic rights36. Recent measures to promote international 
development seemingly continue this trend. In particular the relationship between human rights 
and the MDGs is questionable. At a basic level of observation, Goal one of the MDGs aims to 
“halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger”37, while the 
UDHR declares that no one should be deprived. In a more detailed study of the MDGs, Philip 
Alston claims that Millennium Declaration “references to human rights are relatively fleeting” and 
“rarely rely on any precise formulations”38. Indeed, these goals utilize language which has “no 
fixed normative content, at least when seen from a human rights perspective”39. Pogge also 
emphasizes that the goals themselves were watered down between the Rome Declaration on World 
Food Security in 1996 and the Millennium Declaration in 2000. While the Rome Declaration sought to 
halve by 2015 the number of undernourished, the later Millennium Declaration sought to halve by 
2015 the percentage of people suffering from hunger and extreme poverty40. Of course the fact 
that internationally agreed human rights are being marginalized in official forums could mean 
that there is a greater need for scholars and activists to argue for human rights but it does not 
follow that the political weight of these principles is a powerful motivation for action and 
implementation in contemporary global politics. Clearly it appears that it is the reverse. 
Unfortunately, the appeal to socio-economic human rights is not politically an appealing 
foundation for Pogge’s contention to restructure the global institutional order. 
 
It must be emphasized that this observation does not mean that human rights have little effect 
on global politics. It also does not mean that efforts that have been undertaken to promote 
socio-economic rights and the modest signs of progress should be ignored41. International 
human rights law works in political sense over the long term by developing a normative order 
that stipulates certain types of conduct as desirable and other forms of conduct as undesirable42. 
As such, international law can be conceived as setting out ‘required’ norms of legitimate 
behaviour where some states and NGOs use human rights to shame or leverage recalcitrant 
states into internalising human rights norms43. Of course the problem with human rights 
international law is the weak forms of enforcement for most human rights or, even where there 
                                                 
35 Although it must be stressed in the post World War Two context, western efforts to advance socio-economic 
rights were strong. See Daniel J. Whelan and Jack Donnelly, “The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the 
Global Human Rights Regime: Setting the Record Straight” Human Rights Quarterly - Volume 29, Number 4, 
November 2007, pp. 1144-1147. 
36 Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law", p. 718. 
37 United Nations, UN Millennium Project (2006 [cited May 20 2007]); available from 
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/goals/gti.htm#goal1  
38 Phillip Alston, "Ships Passing in the Night: The Current State of the Human Rights and Development Debate 
Seen Through the Lens of the Millennium Development Goals," Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005), p. 760. 
39 Ibid, p. 760.  
40 Pogge, "The First UN Millennium Development Goal?", p. 378. Pogge indicates that once population growth is 
imputed into the percentage of poverty, that the poverty reduction target “shrunk by 101.5 million” between these 
two declarations. 
41 Alston, "Ships Passing in the Night”, pp. 825-6. 
42 See Roslyn  Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1994), Christian Reus-Smit, "The politics of international law," in The Politics of International Law, ed. Christian Reus-
Smit (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
43 See Magaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in international politics (Cornell: 
Cornell University Press, 1998). 
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are empowered institutions such as the International Criminal Court, the problem is sparse or 
heavily qualified membership and participation by states. But human rights principles have 
reshaped the way that many states have conceived of their own priorities over the last five 
decades – including the delegitimation of colonialism44. So the normative impact of human rights 
has been important in establishing a “standard of civilisation” which promotes the value and 
respect of individual human beings45.  
 
However, this normative development is of little consolation to the global poor who have largely 
been left on the outside of this normative progression. It is clearly the case that the economic 
and subsistence rights are more weakly supported than other forms of human rights in the 
contemporary context. Western support for the indivisibility of civil-political and socio-
economic rights is currently lacking – even though Western support was more fulsome in the 
past46. Contemporary efforts to articulate human rights law have clashed directly with other 
forms international law, such as the international law that enables neo-liberal global capitalism 
which has pragmatically promoted property rights and rights of transnational capitalist agents 
over human rights47. The influence of the US also looms large in support of neo-liberalism and 
in respect to a suspicious and dismissive stance in relation to socio-economic rights. As Pogge 
notes, one of the key problems with the development of economic rights is the near complete 
absence of US support48. This lack of support in recent decades occurs for a range of ideological 
and pragmatic reasons which are unlikely to change any time soon49. As long as the 
preponderance of neo-liberal norms continues there appears to be firm limits on what we can 
expect from socio-economic human rights in practice. 
 
Augmenting Institutional Cosmopolitanism 
 
The preceding observations combine to place doubts on the viability of IC to be a guide to 
political action in theory and practice in respect to global poverty. This doubt stems from an 
incomplete articulation of the types of institutions required to promote justice and poverty 
alleviation. There are two principle problems which stem from preceding analysis. First, local 
institutions are more important to the capacity of IC to address global poverty than Pogge contends. It could be 
argued that states only need to enact civil and political human rights, and promote democracy in 
the domestic domain. However, this counter-argument does not explore the specific types of 
local institutions required to promote democracy, let alone the types of institutions which 
promote development and poverty alleviation. Second, the preceding points mean that there are 
strong reasons to contend that human rights may not generate moral responsibilities and global institutions 
required to support IC and address global patterns of poverty. That is, the failure of these moral 
responsibilities is ethically undesirable but unsurprising and foreseeable. As such, even though 
Pogge develops the case of the necessity of human rights and the duties they bestow very strongly 
as a guide to ethical action in relation to global poverty, the sufficiency of human rights is 
questionable. Furthermore, there is a tendency in the discourse of human rights of emphasizing 
the agency of those who ought to act to fulfil their positive or negative duties. In the case of 
global poverty, it could be said that focusing upon the moral responsibility to promote human 
rights has the effect of therefore emphasising and political agency of the wealthy West while 
downplaying the actual or potential political agency of poor societies and states. Consequently, it is 
                                                 
44 Christian Reus-Smit, "Human rights and the social construction of sovereignty," Review of International Studies 27, 
no. 4, 2001. 
45 Jack Donnelly, "Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization?" International Affairs 74 (January) (1998). 
46 See Whelan and Donnelly, “The West, Economic and Social Rights, and the Global Human Rights Regime” 
47 See Tony Evans, The Politics of Human Rights: A Global Perspective, Second ed. (London: Pluto Press, 2005), Chapter 
4. 
48 Pogge, "Recognized and Violated by International Law", p. 720. 
49 See  Jeffrey  Sachs, "The Development Challenge," Foreign Affairs, no. March/April (2005). 
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not just the existence of legitimate state institutions which matters, but the possibility of 
developing self directed local capacities to promote development. 
 
In order to promote global justice in a non-ideal world IPT must consider contingencies for 
situations where poor societies are not assisted actively and fulsomely supported by wealthy 
states fulfilling their moral responsibilities. In a sense this essay contends that efforts to address 
global poverty need to focus more attention on the effectiveness of institutions rather than 
emphasising questions of precise moral responsibility. As Andrew Kuper argues 
 
It is not enough to say that all persons have equal moral claims on us; we need to ask how best to 
organize ourselves politically and economically to meet those claims. Which combinations of rules and 
institutions of governance are most effective?50 
 
However, I argue that it is necessary to move beyond only asking how global cosmopolitan 
obligations are going to be met and consider the productive role that local institutions and 
responsibilities play in addressing extreme poverty. Focusing on cosmopolitan obligations can 
narrowly focus political imagination and action on the agency, intentions and capabilities of the 
relevant duty bearers, rather on the broader conceptions of possible and practical institutional 
forms which could potentially improve people’s lives. While some of the proposals of IC could 
be undertaken by specific states, more dramatic cosmopolitan transformations of the global 
order are dependent upon Western willpower materialising. 
 
It must be emphasized that this does not invalidate the approach of IC, or cosmopolitanism 
more generally. Rather the issue here is a fundamental question of what should be done, from a 
perspective which seeks to provide a guide to ethical action in theory and practice in relation to 
global poverty, if the human rights responsibilities which connect wealthy countries to the poor 
countries are weakly supported or the global institutions formulated to address global poverty are 
weakly developed. In this context alternative institutional forms become especially important. 
The contention here is that IC is incomplete and requires a fuller consideration of suitable local 
institutions to be a convincing guide to political practice. While reforming the global context is 
absolutely crucial to alleviate global poverty, as Pogge contends, this does not mean that local 
institutions and agency can be neglected from a reasonable guide to moral action in respect to 
global poverty.  
 
One significant counterargument to the view presented here that we need to consider the role of 
local institutions and agency, is to argue for stronger forms of cosmopolitanism. The approach 
of cosmopolitan democracy, for example, would attempt to transcend some of the problems 
indicated here, by replacing the moral responsibilities of the rich and the poor with a democratic 
structure which would transform notions of moral responsibility into political responsibility such 
that global institutions would be accountable for everyone’s welfare. Arguments that seek to 
promote global citizenship are evident in political cosmopolitan arguments of thinkers such as 
David Held and Richard Falk, who argue that the only way to address problems such as global 
poverty is to include everyone in a globally unified democracy underpinned by global citizenship 
and cosmopolitan law51. The development of a cosmopolitan democracy according to these 
authors requires the regulation of economic life that goes against the deregulation and 
privatization associated with neo-liberal capitalism, or even the duties embedded in human rights 
alone52. The proposal of cosmopolitan democracy emphasizes the importance of replacing the 
                                                 
50 Andrew Kuper, "More Than Charity: Cosmopolitan Alternatives to the "Singer Solution"," Ethics and International 
Affairs 16, no. 1 (2002), p. 112. 
51 David Held, Democracy and the Global Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) 
52 Held, Democracy and the Global Order, David Held, Global Covenant (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004) and Richard Falk, 
On Humane Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
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states system which permits poverty, war and environmental degradation with more humane and 
inclusive institutions which include global forms of representation. However, even more so than 
moral cosmopolitanism and the program of IC, political cosmopolitans provoke a wider range of 
criticisms about whether a cosmopolitan democracy is realistic let alone feasible or desirable – 
the type of concerns which IC attempts to avoid. Furthermore, this approach also does not 
engage with the potential utility of local forms of authority and community.  
 
Therefore the question turns to what forms of political theory offer resources in thinking about 
the potential role of the state. Clearly social democratic proposals are one alternative, but 
contemporary arguments overlap considerably with political cosmopolitan arguments53. One, 
largely overlooked, approach which focuses upon the state is neo-roman republicanism. While 
republicanism has a long and contested legacy, it is a form of political reasoning which centres 
on developing civic ethics and institutions which are intent on establishing liberty as a public 
achievement within a given state. While republicanism has been associated with 
“communitarian” scholars such as Michael Sandel and David Miller, who have strongly defended 
the importance of national political community, neo-republican scholars such as Quentin 
Skinner and Philip Pettit have placed republican ideas closer to liberalism by arguing that 
republicans are intent on the liberty of the individual but argue, in contrast to liberalism, that this 
liberty can only be constituted collectively by a appropriately empowered republican state54. 
Consequently, republicanism’s conception of liberty is an institutionalised context where citizens 
are free from subordination or domination from the state itself or from other interests or actors 
in society55. Such a state’s power is managed by checks and balances as well as ongoing citizen 
oversight and public deliberation. The aspiration of republican structures and policies is to 
constitute individual independence by either protecting individuals and dampening down the 
flows of power or augmenting the capacity of individuals to protect themselves from subjection. 
 
Specifically, republican thinking can also contribute arguments in support of developing and 
designing robust states in parts of the world where states are failing or weak as a result of 
endemic civil conflict or tensions56. The UN has advanced statebuilding efforts under the title of 
“peacebuilding” as part of its efforts to ‘follow up’ humanitarian interventions and missions. The 
goal of peacebuilding is the ambitious one of ensuring that fragile and war torn societies do not 
lapse back into conflict and abject poverty through the development of a legitimate state 
apparatus and the promotion of socio-economic development57. The correlation between state 
weakness/failure and poverty, as mentioned previously in relation to UNDP data, is a feature of 
world politics which has important consequences for extreme global poverty as well as global 
and local insecurity58. Rebuilding the political and economic infrastructure of poor countries is 
crucial to enabling them to have any hope in engaging productively with the global economy. 
One of the problematic aspects of both moral and political cosmopolitanism is a lack of 
sustained connection to the problems of state collapse and rebuilding. Statebuilding has 
important analytical, policy and normative implications for avoiding both poverty and insecurity. 
 
                                                 
53 Held, Global Covenant, Chapter 10. 
54 Philip Pettit, Republicanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), Quentin Skinner, Liberty Before Liberalism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
55 Pettit, Republicanism, p. 80. 
56 Michael Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War," International Security 30, no. 4, 2006, 
pp. 87-112. 
57 Simon Chesterman, "State Building and Human Development," Occasional Paper 1 (2005), p. 1-2. 
58 See Stephen  Krasner and Carlos Pascual, "Addressing State Failure" Foreign Affairs Vol 84, Number 4, 2005, p. 
153. 
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However, there are scholars who argue that Western efforts to promote coherent and stable 
states have been unsuccessful and counterproductive59. Some of the blame for this rests, again, 
on the lack of sustained Western willpower and adequate resources. But some of the blame also 
rests on the problems with the liberal panacea which underpinned efforts in the 1990s and 2000s 
to promote stable states. Efforts to promote stability have been undermined by “the destabilizing 
effects” that the promotion of liberal conceptions of free market capitalism and rapid 
democratization has generated60. Consequently Michael Barnett has advanced a republican 
rationale which could and should underpin peacebuilding efforts: 
 
Unlike liberal peacebuilding, which uses shock therapy to push postconflict states toward some 
predetermined vision of the promised land, republicanism’s emphasis on deliberative processes allows 
space for societal actors to determine for themselves what the good life is and how to achieve it61.   
 
Barnett characterizes republicanism as a pragmatic approach to politics which seeks to foster 
local political institutions which promote deliberation and representation, which emphasizes the 
dangers of factions in society and which impose constitutional restraints on authority62. In 
particular such an approach proposes “creating bridges between factions and individuals as they 
build a community might also produce a greater love of country and a sense of patriotism, 
understood as a sense of belonging that transcends race, ethnicity, or other groupings”63. The 
goal in cases of post conflict reconstruction, and even in cases where the institutions of state are 
merely weak or unrepresentative, is to promote the idea of public deliberation as well as the 
formation of local political agency which promotes the needs of society. Crucial here is the sense 
that the republican promotion of statebuilding is concerned more with the participation and 
interests of the given societies rather than the visions and interests of the intervenors. 
 
These republican principles also have a resonance wider than just post conflict rebuilding, given 
the number of states around the world suffering from institutional weakness evident in low levels 
of popular legitimacy, weak or deficient democratic institutions and socio-economic 
underdevelopment. Some economists and observers are cognisant that some neo-liberal 
programs of liberalization and privatization authored by the World Bank and IMF have not 
worked to promote successful development and have not helped to formulate the legal 
infrastructure to underpin vibrant capitalism. This point has also surprisingly been made by 
Francis Fukuyama who says that the “excessive zeal in pursuing this 'neo-liberal' agenda 
undermined the strength of states to carry out those necessary residual government functions”64. 
Indeed, in recent years the IMF and World Bank have actively “sought to emphasize their 
contributions to the poor”65. The controversial nature and the real failings of structural 
adjustment, especially in Africa,66 meant that this program was replaced in 1999 by Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) specific to each participating country. These policies have a 
                                                 
59 David Chandler, "Back to the Future? The Limits of Neo-Wilsonian Ideals of Exporting Democracy," Review of 
International Studies 32, no. 3, 2006, pp. 475-94. 
60 Roland  Paris, "Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism," International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall) 
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61 Barnett, "Building a Republican Peace", p. 90. 
62 Ibid, p. 94. 
63 Ibid, p. 99. For further republican analysis of patriotism and its difference with nationalism see Maurizio Viroli, 
For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). 
64 Francis Fukuyama, "Bring back the state," The Guardian, August 20, 2004. See also Francis Fukuyama, State-
Building:  Governance and World Order in the 21st Century (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
65 Andrew Hurrell, "Global Inequality and International Institutions," Metaphilosophy 32 January (2001), p. 54. 
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renewed emphasis on tailoring programs in each country to achieve poverty reduction and 
economic growth rather than growth alone67. While these measures demonstrate a shift away 
from conventional structural adjustment, they are a modification – not a massive step away from 
the neo-liberal agenda68. However, republicanism would  assert that the public of a state should 
be the ones to determine, through public deliberation in a democratic political system, what 
functions the state should fulfil in order to promote a common sense of liberty – not political 
theorists or international bureaucrats. Republican political theory has relevance not just to 
statebuilding and post conflict rebuilding but the more general debate as to what functions states 
should fulfil in order to promote development. 
 
Nevertheless, both in the case of post conflict rebuilding and the more general circumstance of 
state weakness, the function of outside international institutions and other countries looms large. 
Obviously, countries rebuilding the institutions of a robust state after conflict do not have all the 
resources or the military capacity required to ensure this process is successful and equally clearly, 
the Western world has a moral responsibility to support this process. However, the danger of 
imperialism, real or perceived, is a significant problem. As Nicholas Wheeler suggests in his study 
of humanitarian missions, “there is a dangerous arrogance in the idea that the secure liberal 
societies of the West have the answers”69. It must be emphasized that republicanism is not a ‘one 
size fits all’ blueprint for statebuilding. Barnett stresses that not only does the success of 
republican proposals depend on a range of factors beyond the control of any actor involved in 
post conflict rebuilding process, but the appropriate republican mechanisms to promote 
deliberation and political participation cannot be “addressed in the abstract, but rather require 
judgment informed by a deep knowledge of local circumstances and views”70. In reference to the 
World Bank and IMF there is the long held perception of imperialism and what Andrew Hurrell 
refers to as “coercive developmental paternalism” associated with various forms of 
conditionality71. Therefore efforts to improve the effectiveness and responsiveness of 
international institution policies to developing countries are extremely important. The recent 
development of the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission to act as a central location for expertise 
regarding statebuilding and in assisting in providing predictable finance could be considered one 
modest effort consistent with these imperatives. Likewise the development of the post 
Washington consensus policies  - in respect of the PRSP efforts to enable states to have greater 
‘ownership’ of internationally sponsored programs and the MDGs focus on benchmarks of each 
individual country can be seen to be slightly more responsive to developing states aspirations and 
sovereignty. These measures can be seen to be an improvement in the effectiveness of 
international institution efforts to develop state capacity and in efforts to respect the sovereignty 
of developing states.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This essay’s consideration of IC in relation to global poverty concurs that the moral 
responsibility of the continuing tragedy of patterns of extreme poverty rests principally with 
Western governments and societies. Furthermore, Pogge’s practical proposals such as the global 
resource dividend and a constitutional amendment which qualifies the international borrowing 
privilege of states are important proposals which could improve the condition of the global poor. 
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However, while this essay contends that cosmopolitan moral obligations are valid, this does not 
mean that they offer comprehensive political foundations to address global poverty. In order to 
be a viable guide to political action which addresses global poverty, consideration needs to be 
given to arguments beyond of the ambit of cosmopolitan conceptions of human rights. The 
argument here has been that the reliability of global moral responsibilities is questionable and 
that local institutions such as the state are important to addressing the problem of global poverty 
and currently overlooked by Pogge’s account of IC. The arguments regarding contemporary 
statebuilding could be seen to be measures which could productively parallel and accompany IC. 
In addition, republican arguments for strengthening the institutional foundations of states 
around the world, in terms of enhancing deliberation, citizenship and patriotic principles 
underpinning the state, are an important theoretical counterpoint to cosmopolitanism which 
should be considered alongside cosmopolitan proposals. It must be emphasised that the 
objective of promoting robust states in the developing world does not discharge Western 
obligations to create a more just global economic order nor should be done outside the ambit of 
established human rights principles. 
 
In essence, while the field of IPT has increased its focus on the forms of governance required to 
realise ethical aspirations, the cosmopolitan focus of much of this literature has focused on 
global governance and has not considered the utility of the state. The issue of global poverty 
vividly indicates that local factors and the institutional structures of the state remain important 
elements of any reasonable effort to address extreme poverty. The domestic legitimacy of state 
institutions and local capacities for collective decision-making about economic affairs are 
important and need further consideration within the field of IPT. Furthermore, IPT needs to 
consider local programs of governance and local forms of agency of poor states and societies in 
circumstances where global programs are unlikely to be realised because of inaction by dominant 
states. Furthermore, IPT needs to consider the ethical and practical implications of statebuilding 
more fully. The realisation of global justice requires IPT to couple its consideration of 
prospective forms of global governance with the potentially productive role of the state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
